Shadow over the Atlantic: The Luftwaffe and the U-boats, 1943–45 by Norton, Richard J. & Forsyth, Robert
Naval War College Review
Volume 71
Number 4 Autumn Article 17
2018
Shadow over the Atlantic: The Luftwaffe and the U-
boats, 1943–45
Richard J. Norton
Robert Forsyth
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Norton, Richard J. and Forsyth, Robert (2018) "Shadow over the Atlantic: The Luftwaffe and the U-boats, 1943–45," Naval War
College Review: Vol. 71 : No. 4 , Article 17.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/17
 B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 5 5
often exists when there is a common 
ideology between state and proxy� 
Sanctioning is a relationship whereby the 
proxy is permitted to engage in mali-
cious activities, so long as the ends align 
with the goals of the state� An example 
is Russian criminal organizations that 
are permitted to operate as long as they 
target only non-Russians with their 
criminal activities and occasionally 
turn their skills to patriotic purposes�
The next two sections are the strength 
of Maurer’s book� He closely examines 
all three proxy relationships, identifying 
the strengths and weaknesses of each 
type and using historical examples to 
illustrate his conclusions� Maurer clearly 
establishes historically the benefit of 
proxies to states and explains why 
states are likely to use cyber proxies as 
a tool for the foreseeable future� Maurer 
also does identify the standards for 
international legal responsibility that 
states bear for their proxies; however, 
after initially identifying these standards, 
he discusses them only minimally 
throughout his later case studies�
National security practitioners likely 
will gain the most insight from these 
case studies, in which Maurer applies his 
analytical framework to the use of prox-
ies by the United States, Iran, Russia, 
and China� Drawing on the most recent 
events to highlight the use of cyber prox-
ies by these states, he weaves together 
the economic, social, and political reali-
ties of each state and analyzes how these 
factors affect its use of proxies� Although 
it is tempting to view proxy relation-
ships as being determined solely by the 
governmental actors, Maurer reveals 
how proxies often are a natural out-
growth of their societies� For example, 
he discusses how a combination of 
excellent technical training and poor job 
prospects has led to the increased use 
of sanctioning as a proxy relationship in 
countries of the former Soviet Union�
In conclusion, Cyber Mercenaries is both 
enjoyable to read and an important 
contribution to scholarship on the study 
of cyber conflicts� It dispels many of the 
myths and misunderstandings surround-
ing the use of proxies and provides an 
analytical framework that can be applied 
easily when following news reporting 
on international conflicts in cyberspace� 
It should be on the bookshelf of every 
scholar and practitioner in this vital 
field of national security studies�
JEFFREY BILLER
Shadow over the Atlantic: The Luftwaffe and the 
U-boats, 1943–45, by Robert Forsyth� Oxford, 
U�K�: Osprey, 2017� 312 pages� $30�
As the Second World War recedes ever 
further into the past, more and more 
works emerge that focus on historical 
back pastures or operations either 
overlooked or examined only lightly 
until now� Shadow over the Atlantic is an 
example of such works, but it is also a 
welcome contribution to understanding 
the vital Axis anticonvoy campaign and 
the role of the Luftwaffe in waging war 
at sea� Robert Forsyth is an experienced 
author, with a specialty in World War 
II German aircraft� He tells the story of 
the attempts by the German navy and 
air force to coordinate operations so 
as to maneuver Admiral Karl Dönitz’s 
U-boats into position to savage Allied 
convoys� In doing so, Forsyth focuses 
nearly exclusively on the operations of 
Long-Range Reconnaissance Group 
5, Atlantic (designated FAGr-5)�
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Arguably, the most well-known Ger-
man aircraft of the convoy war was 
the Focke-Wulf 200 Condor� FAGr-5 
instead flew the newer, lesser-known, 
four-engine, twin-tailed Junkers (Ju) 
290� Forsyth, with the passion of 
the true enthusiast, goes into great 
detail concerning the development and 
construction of the aircraft� No signifi-
cant aspect of the plane is overlooked, 
from cockpit controls to armaments 
to the background color of the FAGr-5 
emblem� Aircraft enthusiasts will find 
this detailed information of great 
interest, but lay readers may find just 
a bit too much emphasis on—at times 
literally—the nuts and bolts of the Ju-290�
By 1943, the tide in the U-boat war 
was turning against Admiral Dönitz, 
Germany’s supreme submarine admiral� 
His best commanders were dying, the 
ratio of U-boat losses to Allied tonnage 
sunk was rising, and the amount of 
ocean free from Allied air surveillance 
was decreasing rapidly� German air 
reconnaissance was deemed essential 
if there was to be any realistic hope 
of bringing wolf packs into action 
against the convoys, and thereby truly 
hurting the Allied war effort� Had the 
German navy possessed its own air arm, 
it might have been easier to provide 
this; instead, the Luftwaffe never was 
willing to give maritime reconnaissance 
anything like the support it needed�
Forsyth details how FAGr-5 went about 
its duties� He describes how search 
patterns were established and flown� The 
nascent use of airdropped buoys to try to 
track convoys and serve as navigational 
beacons is examined, as are efforts to 
use other emerging technologies�
For the pilots and aircrews of FAGr-5, 
Atlantic reconnaissance missions were 
long, demanding, and increasingly 
dangerous as Allied air coverage became 
more proficient and pervasive� Missions 
routinely exceeded twelve hours in dura-
tion� Weather conditions frequently were 
miserable, which also increased the risk 
of navigational error and mishap� Allied 
escort carriers and long-range, land-
based fighter-bomber patrols increased 
in number, downing several of the 
group’s Ju-290s and damaging others�
Forsyth tracks the losses and replace-
ment of the group’s aircraft with great 
care, to a level at which it is possible 
to track individual airframes over the 
period� His accounts of air-to-air combat 
are analytical and detailed� Allied 
reports are included to good effect� 
Over the period discussed, attempts to 
direct U-boats into positions to attack 
convoys became less and less effective� 
Forsyth explains that this was owing 
in large part to the Allied ability to 
intercept and decode German radio 
traffic� This effort was so effective that 
the British often knew when Ju-290s 
were actually on patrol and when the 
next aircraft would be airborne�
After the invasion of Normandy in 
June 1944, things became increasingly 
difficult for FAGr-5� Resistance ele-
ments began affecting the squadrons’ 
operations� At times, the group formed 
ground-combat units and cleared local 
villages of resistance fighters, taking 
losses in the process� Getting supplies 
and needed parts from Germany took 
ever longer� Morale was low, but, as 
the records Forsyth accessed make 
clear, no one admitted such “defeatist” 
sentiments� During the same month as 
the Allied invasion, one of the group’s 
more unusual missions was the rescue of 
German meteorologists from Greenland�
Inevitably, FAGr-5 eventually flew its 
last missions over the Atlantic� Group 
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aircraft then departed for friendly 
fields in Germany—leaving the ground 
element to get out of France on its 
own� The account of the latter’s trek 
across France—in an eclectic convoy of 
vehicles with cobbled-together arma-
ments and increasingly diverse groups 
of personnel who joined during the 
retreat—makes for fascinating reading� 
The trip was not without danger, and 
several firefights erupted between group 
personnel and French resistance units�
Yet for all the excellent detail that 
Shadow over the Atlantic provides 
concerning FAGr-5, the human element 
is lacking� The planes and the operations 
are the center of attention; the men of 
the group are identified only rarely� 
There is the occasional mention of 
encouraging sports to boost morale or 
how the loss of a crew was unfortunate, 
but in the end the vast majority of the 
men of FAGr-5 are simply ciphers�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theo-
ry, by Lieutenant General James M� Dubik, USA 
(Ret�)� Foreword by General Martin Dempsey, 
USA (Ret�)� Lexington: Univ� Press of Kentucky, 
2016� 238 pages� $50�
Writer, lecturer, retired general officer, 
and PhD, James Dubik has made a 
significant contribution to military 
scholarship and the practice of war 
fighting with this book� He has in-
troduced a major revision in just war 
theory that undoubtedly will transform 
the viewpoint of supporters and critics 
on this philosophical tradition in applied 
ethics� Dubik understands that his 
proposed revision will not answer all 
objections and naturally will be subject 
to claims of deficiencies and other 
criticisms, but he rightly argues that his 
revised defense of the just war tradition 
advances a new perspective—one 
that undeniably will alter the way in 
which current and future generations 
interpret the justification of war�
Demonstrating a mastery of detail 
and a clarity of understanding, Dubik 
persuasively employs the methodology 
of historiography to support and defend 
his war-waging principles, basing 
them on examples from the Civil War, 
World War II, the Vietnam War, and 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan� This 
methodological technique, reminiscent 
of Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust 
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (Basic Books, 1977), is both 
convincing and engaging for those who 
study history and the art of war� By 
contrast with those who are academics 
and stress concepts primarily and praxis 
secondarily, as well as with those who 
are warfighters and stress praxis primar-
ily and concepts secondarily, Dubik is a 
former Army general who experienced 
the challenges of warfare, yet is now a 
professor at Georgetown University� He 
balances both theory and practice in Just 
War Reconsidered, his magnum opus�
Although Dubik respects and acknowl-
edges the profound contribution to just 
war theory made by Walzer—as part of 
a long line of philosophers and theolo-
gians, including Aristotle, Augustine, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, 
to name only a few—he criticizes the 
customary separation of jus ad bellum 
(justice in going to war) and jus in bello 
(justice in waging war)� Walzer presents 
the usual understanding: that senior civil 
leaders debate the criteria that justify 
going to war, represented by jus ad bel-
lum, and then, once a national decision 
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